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Abstract—With the growing incidents of flash crowds and
sophisticated DDoS attacks mimicking benign traffic, it be-
comes challenging to protect Internet-based services solely
by differentiating attack traffic from legitimate traffic. While
fair-sharing schemes are commonly suggested as a defense
when differentiation is difficult, they alone may suffer from
highly variable or even unbounded waiting times. We propose
RainCheck Filter (RCF), a lightweight primitive that guaran-
tees bounded waiting time for clients despite server flooding
without keeping per-client state on the server. RCF achieves
strong waiting time guarantees by prioritizing clients based on
how long the clients have waited—as if the server maintained a
queue in which the clients lined up waiting for service. To avoid
keeping state for every incoming client request, the server sends
to the client a raincheck, a timestamped cryptographic token
that not only informs the client to retry later but also serves as
a proof of the client’s priority level within the virtual queue.
We prove that every client complying with RCF can access the
server in bounded time, even under a flash crowd incident or
a DDoS attack. Our large-scale simulations confirm that RCF
provides a small and predictable maximum waiting time while
existing schemes cannot. To demonstrate its deployability, we
implement RCF as a Python module such that web developers
can protect a critical server resource by adding only three lines
of code.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet users are impatient. A recent study found that
more than half of online shoppers abandon websites that fail
to load in three seconds [1]. When a wait is unavoidable,
users perceive known, finite waits to be shorter than uncer-
tain waits [2], and are willing to wait much longer periods
given visual feedback, such as a progress bar [3], [4].
In the presence of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks, users would suffer from an uncertain or even infinite
waiting time for accessing an online service, as neither
the server nor the user knows when the attack will cease.
Unfortunately, DDoS attacks are easy to launch and can
∗ This work was done while the authors were at Carnegie Mellon
University.
cause severe damage. Enterprise solutions for DDoS pro-
tection (e.g., adding more servers or using Content Delivery
Networks) may be too costly for small- and medium-sized
companies to afford [5], and CDN web hosting may not be
suitable for security-sensitive services. Also, sophisticated
DDoS attacks successfully emulate flash crowds and become
stealthier as the attacks target scarce server resources, such
as CPU and disk I/O, with only a low traffic volume [6]. It
is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate the
attack traffic from the legitimate traffic for DDoS defense.
Even under a DDoS attack or a flash-crowd incident, it
is important for a server to guarantee a Maximum Waiting
Time (MWT) to its clients in addition to accurate waiting
time estimates, since the MWT ensures that a client’s request
is accepted for the service within some finite time T .
Unfortunately, existing fairness based (e.g., fair queueing)
or proof-of-work based (e.g. computational puzzles) DDoS
countermeasures fail to provide any MWT guarantee.
In this paper, we present RainCheck Filter (RCF), a DDoS
mitigation primitive that enables a server to guarantee a
MWT to clients when the server is overloaded. The core idea
behind RCF is simple yet effective: RCF prioritizes clients’
requests based on their waiting time (i.e., the time elapsed
from the initial request) and rate-limit the number of requests
per client, as if the server maintains an infinite queue in
which the clients’ requests are lined up waiting for the
service. To simulate the infinite queue with a small physical
buffer, in RCF the server sends the client a raincheck, a
timestamped cryptographic token which not only tells the
client when to retry but also serves as a proof of the client’s
priority level. In other words, an infinite virtual queue is
simulated using rainchecks propagating over the network
and stored at clients’ buffer. Rainchecks are only valid for
a limited time duration so that the server can efficiently
rate limit each client and prevent raincheck reuse without
keeping per-client state. RCF can be used to protect any
critical resource, for example, as a middlebox in front of a
flooded link or a server. Due to the rapid growth of DDoS
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attacks at the application layer [6], we mainly focus on
applying RCF to protect critical resources at the server in
this paper.
We prove that a RCF client can access the server within
a finite time T which is linear in the number of clients.
Besides achieving strong guarantees, RCF is lightweight
and extremely simple to deploy. Our implementation shows
that RCF can operate at line rate, and requires minimal
modification to servers and no modification to clients. We
envision that RCF can work as a complementary defense to
resolve server overload when detection-based schemes fail
to block bots, and as a primary mediation for flash crowds.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We present RCF, a lightweight DDoS mitigation prim-
itive that helps legitimate clients obtain their fair share
of the server’s processing power by utilizing the net-
work as an infinite virtual queue. RCF can mitigate
flash crowds and be a last resort when it is ineffective
or insufficient to separate the attack traffic from the
legitimate traffic.
• We prove that RCF achieves MWT guarantees with
only a small amount of state that is independent from
the number of users, and that RCF does not require
precise request scheduling, which none of the prior
work can achieve.
• We thoroughly evaluate the performance and effective-
ness of RCF using theoretical analysis, simulations,
and an implementation. Our results confirm that in
practice RCF not only guarantees bounded waiting
time but also reduces variance in the waiting time.
Such characteristics enable servers to provide reliable
feedback to clients.
• We introduce a fully functional RCF Python module
that can provide fine-grained (i.e. per-URL) protection
to web developers with merely three additional lines of
code. No modification is required on the client side.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Our primary goal is to provide Maximum Waiting Time
(MWT) guarantees during server flooding, where the flood
of incoming requests deplete the server’s scarce resources
(e.g., processor, disk I/O, or internal bandwidth.) As we
are interested in the context of server flooding attacks, we
assume that the network infrastructure, such as the link
bandwidth, is well-provisioned.
A server may be flooded by either bots or legitimate
clients, and the waiting time for legitimate clients may
grow indefinitely. In a flash crowd, the server is swamped
with requests from legitimate clients alone. In a bot-driven
DDoS attack, the adversary directs compromised endhosts
to overload the server with an overwhelming number of
requests. In this paper, we make no assumption on the
adversary’s power and strategy. For example, a powerful and
smart adversary can compromise the majority of endhosts
and target one client to increase the client’s waiting time.
We consider flooding by initial requests but not data
following the requests, as the server can rate limit the
requests and never accept requests at a rate higher than what
it can support.
Waiting time model. Among various waiting time guar-
antees, we consider a strong notion called maximum waiting
time (MWT) guarantees – a finite time T within which a
client’s request is accepted for service [7].
From the server’s perspective, the waiting time of a
client request c that is accepted after rc times of retries
is: T (c) = T (c, rc) − T (c, 0), where T (c, i) is the time at
which the server sees the ith retry by client c, and the 0th
retry represents the original request. Similarly, the waiting
time from a client’s perspective, T ′(c), is the elapsed time
from the time of client’s initial request to the time that
client receives the acceptance response from the server after
rc retries: T ′(c) = T (c) + RTT (c) + process(c), where
RTT(·) and process(·) indicate the round trip time and the
server’s request processing time, respectively. Assuming that
RTT(·) and process(·) are bounded, a bounded T (c) implies
a bounded T ′(c). Hence, without loss of generality we
consider only the waiting time observed by the server.
Server model. When a request arrives, the server first
performs some operations at line rate, such as replay detec-
tion. Since the incoming request rate, Rin, is bounded by
the network line rate, the server can process every request
before adding it to a queue. The queue is kept in fast memory
such that enqueue and dequeue operations can be done at
line rate as well. The server’s processing rate, Rs, is limited
by bottleneck operations (e.g., database query).
Client model. We consider a network of N clients,
consisting of Z compromised and N −Z legitimate clients,
where Z and N are bounded but may be unknown to
the server. Typically, compromised clients are controlled
by an adversary via malware, while legitimate clients are
controlled by their human users.
We assume that each client has a unique and unforgeable
ID but make no assumption on how IDs are defined. Web
developers can flexibly choose their identification methods,
such as login, CAPTCHA, single-sign-on, IP address, or a
combination of multiple factors. For example, a member-
based web service can use login credentials as IDs to
mitigate flash crowds. We discuss possible choices of client
IDs and compare them in Appendix A.
Desired properties. A practical system should be effi-
cient, immediately deployable, and usable. These desired
properties are translated into the following design require-
ments:
• MWT guarantees: The DDoS-limiting primitive
should bound the waiting time of a legitimate client,
and the bound should be independent of other clients’
strategies.
• Minimal overhead for both clients and servers:
The DDoS-limiting primitive should incur minimal
overhead for both servers and clients, thereby avoiding
the increase of the attack surface. In particular, the
primitive should avoid per-request or per-client state
on a server.
• No modification to clients and the network in-
frastructure: To support immediate deployment, the
system should be easy to adopt on the server side and
requires no modification to clients and the network
infrastructure.
• Accurate feedback: The server’s estimate of a client’s
waiting time should be within a reasonable error margin
of the actual waiting time in order to increase users’
willingness to wait.
III. RAINCHECK FILTER
Our core observation about RCF is that Maximum Waiting
Time (MWT) guarantees can be achieved if the server keeps
a large queue of size N , where N is the number of clients.
We call this an ideal buffer because in reality we would like
to avoid keeping per-client state. RCF simulates the ideal
buffer using a realistic buffer whose size is much smaller
than N by leveraging the network as an infinite virtual
queue. Such a simulation is achieved through the exchange
of a special type of message called raincheck between the
client and the server.
We first present a simple approach using an ideal buffer
and discuss its fundamental properties to achieve MWT
guarantees. We then present RCF, which satisfies the fun-
damental properties, but with a realistic buffer. The notation
is summarized below.
c Client ID
ρc Client c’s raincheck
N Total number of clients
Rs Server’s request processing rate
Z Number of compromised clients
L Server queue length (L≪ N )
∆ Raincheck expiration period
∆pause Pause time before resend
t Current time
tstart Start of the lifetime
tend End of the lifetime
Table I: Notation
A. MWT Guarantees Using an Ideal Buffer
Using a buffer of size N , we can achieve MWT guarantees
as follows. The buffer is modeled as a FIFO queue that
enqueues incoming requests. By limiting each client to have
no more than one request in the queue, we ensure that the
buffer never overflows. Since the server can process Rs
requests per time unit, the waiting time is bounded by NRs .
This approach adopts a simple rate-limiting policy (i.e.,
one request per client in the queue) as well as a request-
ranking policy that orders requests by their age, or the time
during which a request has stayed in the buffer. The server
processes the request with the lowest rank (i.e., the oldest
request) first.
We observe that the request-ranking policy presents two
properties that lead to MWT guarantees in this ideal case:
(1) The initial rank of each request is bounded, and (2) the
rank decreases over time. In Section IV-A, we generalize
this observation and present a theorem that we use to prove
RCF’s MWT guarantee.
B. RCF Design
With a buffer of size L ≪ N , a flooded server has to
discard most of the requests, making it difficult for the server
to treat each client fairly and to bound the waiting time. To
address this challenge, RCF leverages the network as an
infinite virtual queue from which the server can retrieve the
knowledge of previously dropped requests.
RCF is designed as a generic primitive that can be applied
at different protocol layers and granularities. In this section,
we describe high-level overview of the RCF protocol design,
and present in Section VI-B the implementation details of
RCF that supports per-URL protection at the application
layer.
Overview. Figure 1 illustrates how RCF works on an
overloaded server. The server can (1) accept, (2) reject, or
(3) postpone an incoming request, which could be either
raincheck-carrying or raincheck-absent. When the server
needs to postpone a request, the server asks the client to
revisit at a later time by issuing a raincheck to the client.
Note that a raincheck-carrying request can be postponed
again, in which case the client obtains an updated raincheck.
To manage rainchecks, RCF implements two core compo-
nents on the server side—raincheck issuance and raincheck
validation—both of which operate at line rate.
The raincheck validation component checks a raincheck’s
validity using the server’s secret key. Requests with an
invalid (e.g., expired) raincheck are rejected, while requests
with a valid raincheck are added to a priority queue of length
L, in which a request that has waited longer gets higher
priority.
For each valid yet dropped request, the raincheck issuance
component constructs a raincheck using a server’s secret
key and returns the raincheck to the client. Rainchecks
are protected using Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
to prevent forgery, tampering, or sharing among multiple
clients. The client can resend its request with the returned
raincheck as a proof of the waiting time.
Raincheck-absent requests are forwarded to the raincheck
issuance component directly (rather than being assigned the
lowest priority) for two reasons: (1) To prevent the server
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Figure 1: RCF overview.
from queuing requests with spoofed IP addresses (the client
must return with the raincheck in order to use the server’s
service), and (2) to ensure bounded waiting time. Otherwise,
a raincheck-absent request can be stuck in the queue forever
when raincheck-carrying requests arrive at the same speed
as the server’s processing rate.
One major challenge is how to prevent double-spending
of rainchecks without keeping per-client state. To address
this challenge, we impose on every raincheck a valid lifetime
from tstart = t+∆pause to tend = tstart+∆. Consequently,
the server only needs to remember accepted requests for
∆pause + ∆ period of time since any other raincheck of a
client will expire after that. The server can adjust ∆pause and
∆ to strike a balance between communication and storage
overhead.
Raincheck message format. A raincheck contains a
MAC that protects client ID c, timestamp ts, and lifetime
[tstart, tend), all computed with the server’s secret key
k such that an adversary cannot tamper with or forge a
raincheck:
ρc = m‖MACk(m), where m = c‖ts‖tstart‖tend. (1)
A unique client ID c is included to enable rate limiting
based on source identities and to prevent two clients from
sharing their rainchecks. Since each MAC is computed using
the server’s secret key, only the server can correctly create
and validate the raincheck. If the server enables more than
one instance of RCF, each RCF should use a different secret
key.
C. Server Description
Raincheck issuance. A raincheck issued or renewed at
time t is valid from tstart = t+∆pause to tend = tstart +
∆, where ∆pause is a small amount of minimum time that
the client has to wait before resending. Moreover, when a
raincheck-absent request arrives, the server drops the request
directly and returns to the client c a raincheck in which the
timestamp is the current time. When a queue overflows, a
raincheck-carrying request is dropped and directed to the
raincheck issuance component for renewal but the timestamp
stays the same as the one in the old raincheck.
Since the server issues a raincheck to every dropped
request, a client can have multiple valid rainchecks concur-
rently. However, having multiple valid rainchecks provides
no additional benefits to the client, because the server (or its
raincheck validation component) limits the rate of accepted
rainchecks per client as described below.
Raincheck validation. For efficient double-spending pre-
vention and rate limiting, the server keeps a set Accepted
that contains requests that were accepted during time [t −
(∆+∆pause), t). We denote by Accepted(c) whether a client
c’s request is in the set. Similarly, we denote by Buffered(c)
whether c’s request is currently buffered in the queue. Size
of these records are irrelevant to the total clients and can be
implementd efficiently using Bloom Filter variants [8], [9].
A raincheck is valid if all of the following conditions hold:
1. Lifetime: tstart ≤ cur time < tend.
2. No duplicate: The same raincheck cannot be reused
more than once
3. Limited client request rate: Only one request is
allowed per client in any interval ∆. That is, a client’s
request is accepted only if Accepted(c) = False and
Buffered(c) = False. This condition can be easily
extended to allowing multiple requests per client in a
time interval, which is useful when one instance of RCF
is deployed to protect multiple critical resources.
4. Integrity: the MAC is verified correctly.
The first three conditions ensure that once a client’s request
is accepted, all other rainchecks that he possesses become
invalid.
Valid requests are added to the priority queue and ranked
unambiguously based on their timestamps.1 If L requests are
already queued, this component dequeues the lowest priority
request, issues a raincheck, and returns it to the client.
D. Client Description
Figure 2 illustrates the client-server interaction in the
RCF protocol. The client initiates the protocol by sending a
raincheck-absent request. The server returns to the client a
raincheck that expires after ∆ in the future.
Before the raincheck expires, the client resends the
raincheck-carrying request, and if the server is still busy, the
client obtains a renewed raincheck with an extended lifetime.
The client keeps resending until the request is accepted.
We prove in Section IV that a client following this resend
strategy will be able to access the server after a bounded
delay.
A greedy client may attempt to reduce the waiting time by
resending the request as quickly as possible. However, our
protocol guarantees that the greedy client gains no benefit if
he sends at a rate faster than RsL , because the buffer keeps
only one copy of the request for each client. Moreover, the
server explicitly specifies in the raincheck how long the
client has to wait before retrying (i.e., setting tstart in the
1A trade-off exists between the timestamp granularity and the waiting
time bound. When at most v requests are allowed with the same timestamp
value, the waiting time bound is increased by v
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raincheck’s lifetime) to further restrain greedy clients and to
minimize communication overhead.
E. Configurations and Further Improvements
To build a practical and deployable system, we have
investigated the details of RCF’s functionalities, corner
cases, and the actual parameter configurations for MWT
guarantees (e.g., minimum number of requests for various
application scenarios, estimated number of requests that the
bottleneck server can process given varying processing time,
∆ configuration to satisfy performance requirements, etc.).
We highlight the core ideas in this section, and leave the
detailed description in the appendix.
1. Accurate waiting time estimation. Providing users
with feedback of their expected waiting time can help
increase their willingness to wait [3], [4]. While the waiting
time bound T can serve as a loose estimate of the actual
waiting time, a better estimate that incorporates the current
client status is desirable. We design and analyze a rank
estimation algorithm that allows the server to estimate any
client c’s rank (i.e., position in the virtual queue) at time
t without keeping per-client state. Extending probabilistic
counting algorithms [10], our algorithm described in Ap-
pendix B refines the estimate by taking into account the
number of clients that did not renew their rainchecks, and the
server informs the client the estimated rank by piggybacking
it on the raincheck.
2. Balancing load distribution. To avoid sudden increase
in the bandwidth loads in the rare case when all clients
concurrently retry, it is desirable to distribute the bandwidth
loads caused by raincheck renewals. We propose a hybrid
scheme that combines RCF with a coarse-grained scheduling
for balancing load distribution in Appendix C. Similar to
the original RCF, this hybrid scheme requires each client to
renew its raincheck periodically. The novel improvement is
the assignment of the coarse time interval such that all the
requests from the same client always fall in the same time
interval, reducing the overhead for duplicate detection and
rate limiting.
3. Accommodating multiple rainchecks. There are ap-
plications where multiple rainchecks may be needed per
client. For example, if RCF is applied to the HTTP protocol
and each raincheck allows one HTTP request, multiple
rainchecks would be needed to load a single webpage.2
Getting a raincheck for each request sequentially would
significantly increase the waiting time of the client. Our
implementation in Section VI-B resolves this issue by
enabling one RCF instance per resource-consuming URL,
which likely accounts for a small set of all the HTTP
requests for a webpage, such that the client can use multiple
rainchecks in parallel. We also explore in Appendix D the
effects of using an extended rate limit mechanism that allows
a sender to have multiple requests in one virtual queue.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Waiting Time Guarantees
To prove that RCF guarantees MWT, we first show two
properties of a rank function that imply MWT, and then that
RCF satisfies these two properties.
Let tinic be the time at which the server sees client c’s
first trial and taccc be the time at which the sever accepts c’s
request/retry. We denote by rank(c, t) client c’s priority of
service (e.g., the position in the ideal queue) at time t, and
rank(c, t) is defined only for tinic ≤ t < taccc . Client c is
served immediately at time t when rank(c, t) = 0.
The rank function in RCF can be formulated as
rank(c, t) , |{c′|c′ <t c}|, where c1 <t c2 means c1 has a
lower rank than c2 at time t (i.e. at time t client c1 has a valid
raincheck whose timestamp is smaller than any of client c2’s
valid raincheck.) When rank(c, t) < L (i.e., server queue
length), c’s request will be accepted.
Theorem 1: Properties of a rank function ensuring MWT.
There is a bound T such that for all c, taccc − tinic ≤ T , and
T is independent of the attacker’s power or strategy if the
rank function satisfies the two conditions:
1. The initial rank of each client is bounded:
rank(c, tinic ) ≤ B for all c, and B is adversary-
independent.
2. The rank of each client decreases over time: ∃ δ > 0
and γ > 0 such that rank(c, t−δ)−rank(c, t) ≥ γ > 0
for all c and t, and δ and γ are adversary-independent.
Sketch of Proof: Since it takes at most δBγ time to reduce
a client’s rank to zero, the waiting time is bounded: T ≤ δBγ .
That is, the server guarantees MWT for any ranking function
that satisfies the above two conditions.
Theorem 2: RCF guarantees MWT. RCF guarantees that
a legitimate client will be served in a finite time T , regard-
less of how other (both legitimate or compromised) clients
behave, and T is linear in the total number of clients.
2A a typical webpage requires multiple HTTP requests, and modern
browsers support concurrent HTTP connections (e.g., Firefox allows 15
concurrent connections).
Sketch of Proof: In RCF, the initial rank is bounded by
N , the number of clients in the network. Between c’s i-
th and i + 1-th retries that are at least LRs time apart, the
server either accepts c’s request or accepts L requests from
the more privileged clients. Also, RCF ensures that once a
client’s request is accepted, all its rainchecks become invalid.
Therefore, rank(c, t) decreases by L for every retry, which
means after at most ⌈NL ⌉ attempts the server will accept the
request. Also, as specified in Section III, a legitimate client
resends its request at a frequency f such that 1∆+∆pause ≤
f ≤ min{RsL , 1∆pause }. Hence, based on Theorem 1, the
waiting time is bounded as follows:
T (C) ≤
⌈
rank(C, tinic )
L
⌉
/f ≤
⌈
N
L
⌉
(∆ +∆pause). (2)
If the RTT is not negligible compared to ∆+∆pause, the
bound should be revised to ⌈NL ⌉(∆ + ∆pause + RTT ) to
compensate the delay.
The upper bound represents the worst case scenario where
a strong attacker who knows the client’s request sending
schedule and controls every host except the victim client and
server. In the presence of a realistic attacker not targeting a
specific client, the actual waiting time can be much lower
than the upper bound, because bots will keep consuming
their high-ranked rainchecks while the legitimate client waits
silently. This demonstrates a strength of RCF: the client
can increase its priority by simply waiting, in contrast to
prior work where the client has to “work”, such as solving
computational puzzles.
B. Overhead Analysis
RCF incurs low computational, communication, and stor-
age overhead for both servers and clients. Clients are not
required to perform any additional computation. A client
simply keeps the most recent raincheck for each protected re-
source, and renews the raincheck roughly every ∆+∆pause
time period.
Our implementation uses a 32-byte raincheck format: 32-
bit client ID, 64-bit microsecond-level timestamp, 32-bit
lifetime of the raincheck as an offset from the timestamp,
and 128-bit MAC. Given this size, the server’s computational
overhead is minimal. For each generated raincheck, the
server has to perform one MAC generation, and for each
received raincheck, the server performs one MAC verifi-
cation. With an efficient MAC function, rainchecks can be
generated and verified at line rate. For example, it takes only
61 cycles (22ns) to compute a 128-bit CBC-MAC using AES
on Intel i5-4430S that supports the AES-NI instruction set.
Our implementation in Section VI confirms that enabling
RCF does not degrade the service throughput.
RCF avoids keeping state for all clients at the cost of
sending rainchecks, but RCF only keeps the “recently” (not
every) accepted clients to support efficient validations (e.g.,
rate-limiting, duplicate detection) using expiration time. A
server can further adjust the raincheck expiration period
to strike a balance between communication and storage
overhead.
RCF only incurs a small overhead to communication
between servers and clients. For instance, when applying
RCF to HTTP applications, the size of the HTTP header
(where a raincheck would be stored) increases by less than
5%—the size of typical HTTP request/response headers are
700-800 bytes [11] and a raincheck is 32 bytes. Moreover,
RCF explicitly specifies how long clients have to wait before
retrying and thus incurs small overhead compared with
the case where greedy clients or bots aggressively resend
requests.
In RCF, initial requests without a raincheck are rejected,
and a raincheck is issued and returned to the client. This
initial rejection adds resiliency against IP spoofing attacks,
but adds slight latency to serve the request. To minimize the
initial latency, RCF can be dynamically enabled and disabled
by the server. During peacetime (e.g., server utilization less
than 70%), RCF remains inactive so that incoming new
requests are served by the server. When the server utilization
increases beyond the threshold, the RCF becomes active and
start issuing rainchecks to incoming new requests.
C. Security Benefits
We design RCF to avoid expanding the attack surface:
Rainchecks are protected against forgery with Message Au-
thentication Codes that can be generated and validated at line
rate. RCF prevents traffic amplification attacks as rainchecks
are smaller than typical HTTP request/response headers.
Also, RCF is secure against source spoofing and other
misuses (e.g., raincheck reuse, accumulation, or sharing),
and prevents compromised or greedy clients from gaining
an advantage over legitimate clients.
V. EVALUATION
To validate that RCF effectively simulates an infinite
buffer and thereby enables bounded waiting time with low
variance in the presence of flash crowds or DDoS attacks,
we evaluate RCF using the NS-3 simulator. Our large-scale
simulation measures the waiting time of legitimate users in
two cases. Section V-A describes a flash-crowd case where
a large number of legitimate users simultaneously try to
access a server within a short-time period. Section V-B
shows a DDoS attack case where a server is flooded by
bots. For both cases, we compare results among (1) RCF,
(2) a traditional client-server model with no protection, and
(3) a computational puzzle [12].
A. Flash-Crowd Effect
We consider 100,000 legitimate clients, and a server that
can buffer up to 200 requests and process requests at a rate
following an exponential distribution with an average of 5
Figure 3: Scatter plots of the initial request time vs served time.
ms. Every client makes one request where the initial request
time is uniformly distributed across a 100-second interval,
and hence, the server experiences on average 1,000 incoming
requests per second, five times the rate of its average request
processing capacity. Next we briefly describe the server and
client models to simulate the flash-crowd effect.
Computational puzzles. We model a client that solves
a computational puzzle before sending a request [12]. We
model the puzzle server with a priority queue which uses
the puzzle-level as the priority metric. For requests with the
same priority level, the server processes them based on their
arrival order.
To send an initial request, the client solves a level-1
puzzle. If the request with level-n is denied, the client solves
a level-(n+1) puzzle and resubmits its request. The puzzle
computation time determines the delay that a client waits
before submitting its request. The delay associated with
a l-level puzzle is derived from the geometric distribution
0.01geometric(2−l), as the number of computed hashes
before successfully finding a length-l hash is geometrically
distributed.
Unprotected. The unprotected server implements a stan-
dard FIFO queue and informs the client whenever its request
is dropped. The client continues to resubmit requests until
one of those request is processed by the server.
Results. The waiting times for the clients of the three
models are shown as scatter plots in Fig. 3. Each dot or
diamond in the scatter plot shows the requested time (x-
value) and the accepted time (y-value) for a client’s request.
A green dot on the left figure represents a request of an
unprotected client while a green dot on the right figure
represents a request of a puzzle client. In both figures,
the red diamonds represent the requests of the raincheck
clients. The solidly filled-in green trapezoid areas in both
figures demonstrate the large variances of the waiting times
for unprotected and puzzle clients: some lucky clients are
served almost immediately, while most clients are unlucky
and experience long waiting times.
On the other hand, RCF clients, marked by red diamonds,
resemble a thin line indicating that RCF supports low
variance such that the waiting time steadily increases as
the number of requests that are yet to be served increases.
Specifically, the ordering of the requests is well-preserved—
requests generated at earlier times are served before the
requests generated at later times. Although not shown in
the figure, the scatter plot for the raincheck server is almost
identical to that for an ideal server that has an infinite buffer.
B. Flooding Attacks
We consider 10,000 legitimate clients and bots ranging
from 10,000 to 200,000 to observe the relationship between
the volume of attack traffic and the waiting times that the
clients experience. In this experiment, every client makes
one request and the request times are uniformly distributed
across a 200 second interval, and the servers’ capacity are
identical to the simulation in V-A.
To simulate the DDoS attack case, the bots adopt the
following strategies to flood the servers. The bot’s request
generation model follows a Poisson process with λ = 1.
Attacker strategy against RCF. Since a RCF server
favors requests with earlier timestamps, simple flooding (i.e.,
sending new requests at a high rate) is ineffective. Instead,
a bot saves all valid rainchecks and sends the one with the
earliest timestamp for each flooding period. Only when the
bot runs out of valid (unexpired) rainchecks, it sends a new
request.
Attacker strategy against puzzles. Since the puzzle
server favors requests with higher-level puzzles, a puzzle bot
submits a request with the highest puzzle-level that it solves
in a requests generation interval. In addition to shorten the
puzzle computation time, bots collaborate with each other,
and the collaborative puzzle solving time is modeled as
0.01
|bots|*geometric(2−l).
Attacker strategy against unprotected. A bot periodi-
cally submits a request to the server.
Results. The distribution of the waiting times of the
10,000 clients are shown as box plots in Fig. 4. Similar to
the flash-crowd simulation, this simulation confirms that the
maximum waiting times for the raincheck clients are much
smaller than the unprotected and puzzle clients regardless of
the number of bots. In addition, the simulation also confirms
that the variance of the waiting times are smaller than the
other two cases (shown by the height of the boxes). Although
not drawn in the figure, the maximum waiting times for the
raincheck clients are below the upper bound in Eq. 2.
The maximum waiting time varies significantly for the
unprotected clients. The increase in variance becomes more
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Figure 4: Box plot of the waiting times for 10,000 clients under varying number of bots for the raincheck server, puzzle server, and unprotected server. Note that the mean
waiting times for the unprotected server goes up to 800 sec (and thus outside the graph).
dramatic as the number of bots increases. This is because
the unprotected server treats every request equally and the
bot’s collective request submission rate is much higher than
that of the clients, depriving clients’ access to the server.
For the puzzle clients, while the median waiting time is
comparable to that of the raincheck clients, the variance
among the waiting times as well as the maximum waiting
times are higher than that of the raincheck clients. This large
variance is attributed to the amount of time needed to solve
the puzzles.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the efficiency and feasibility of RCF, we
implement RCF (1) on a high-bandwidth testbed supporting
line-rate raincheck validation and issuance, and (2) as a
Python module that can be easily incorporated into HTTP
servers.
A. DPDK Testbed Evaluation
In this evaluation, we show that raincheck generation and
validation can be done at line rate on a commodity machine
and thus do not cause any additional bottleneck at the server.
Testbed Setup. We build a small testbed containing two
machines—one machine to simulate a malicious traffic gen-
erator (TG) and the other to simulate a RCF. Two machines
are directly connected to each other via a gigabit ethernet
cable and operate on identical commodity PCs with the
following hardware specification: 4-core Intel Core i5-4430S
CPU (Haswell), 1,600 MHz Hynix DDR3 4GB memory, and
one dual-port 10 GbE NIC (Intel 82599EB).
We use Intel Data Plane Development Kit [13] (DPDK)
as the packet I/O engine on both machines to generate and
process high-bandwidth traffic. Intel DPDK supports high-
performance packet processing without involving the system
kernel. DPDK avoids OS interrupts while packets are being
transferred between the user space and the NIC’s memory
buffer to eliminate redundant memory copies in the kernel.
AES-CBC-MAC in RCF is implemented using the Intel
AES-NI instruction set [14], a hardware accelerated crypto-
graphic engine, to efficiently verify/issue rainchecks.
Experiment Design. TG initiates the experiment by
sending a request packet to RCF (Step 1). Upon receiving
the request, RCF generates a raincheck and sends a packet
with the raincheck back to TG (Step 2). After this initial
exchange, we start measuring the performance of RCF for
raincheck validation and issuance in the following manner:
TG simply forwards the raincheck-carrying packet back to
the server (Step 3). Then, RCF validates the raincheck,
updates the raincheck with a new timestamp, and sends the
updated raincheck back to TG (Step 4). Steps 3 and 4 are
repeated to measure the worst-case processing time of an
incoming request.
For comparison, we establish the following baseline case:
(1) TG sends the initial requests to RCF, (2) RCF replies
a packet with a dummy raincheck, (3) TG immediately
resends the received request back to the server, and (4) RCF
simply forwards the packet back to TG without verifying
or updating the raincheck. Steps (3) and (4) are repeated for
evaluation.
Result. For the baseline case, TG sends raincheck-
carrying requests to the server at a rate of 9.826 Gbps3.
The same rate of 9.826 Gbps is achieved for the raincheck
case. Even though RCF has to validate and issue a raincheck
for each incoming request, we observed no degradation
in throughput, confirming that the raincheck computation
incurs a low overhead.
B. Raincheck over HTTP
In this section, we present how RCF can be easily
deployed to HTTP servers. Applying RCF to web servers
can efficiently rate-limit requests that are compute-intensive
(e.g., WolframAlpha) or IO-intensive (e.g., database queries)
while ensuring per-client fair access.
Our implementation is a Python module that serves as
an extension of Flask4, a microframework for Python web
development. This solution is practical in the real world
because it requires no modification nor additional installation
on the client side, and incurs minimal effort on server side.
Specifically, our server-side implementation works as an
intermediate level between the web server and the applica-
tion, using Python’s decorator feature such that developers
can integrate RCF to existing server applications with little
effort.
Listing 1 demonstrates the basic usage of the module.
Text in bold is the additional code needed for applying the
RainCheck module. Beside initialization (line 5), developers
only have to add a line of code to mark the critical
resource they want to protect (line 8). It is independent of
applications being protected so that developers can easily
turn RCF on and off even without any knowledge about the
implementation details of applications.
The RainCheck module provides per-URL fine-grained
protection, which is useful to flexibly apply RCF to critical
resources only and leave noncritical resources (e.g., static
content) freely accessible. Specifically, it allows different
configurations and separated queues for different URLs,
which is essential for web servers to provide various ser-
vices.
3We cannot achieve the full capacity of 10 Gbps due to the bottleneck
at the PCI that interconnects the NIC to the mainboard.
4http://flask.pocoo.org
1 from flask import Flask
2 app = Flask(__name__)
3
4 from raincheck import RainCheck
5 rc = RainCheck(queue_size=100, time_pause=1,
time_interval=10, concurrency=4)
6
7 @app.route('/')
8 @rc.raincheck()
9 def index():
10 # compute-intensive or IO-intensive jobs
11 return resp
Listing 1: Basic usage of the RCF module.
Implementation Details. We fully implemented the
RainCheck module described in Section III including is-
suance, validation, communication protocol, and ranking.
The following are additional details and concerns of the
implementation.
Rainchecks are carried through HTTP cookies, a common
feature that the majority of clients support, so no additional
modifications are needed on the client side. Cookies pro-
vide a simple mechanism allowing us to renew and expire
rainchecks.
We use HTTP Refresh header to indicate how long a
client should wait before coming back to renew its raincheck
(i.e., no time syncronization is needed). The refresh time
is uniformly random from tstart to tend − tnetwork delay .
Consequently, subsequent renewing requests will not cluster
together regardless of clients’ initial requesting pattern.
In addition to using the source IP as the client ID, we
accept any entry in session storage5 as the client ID, allowing
developers to use login, CAPTCHA, single-sign-on, or other
identification methods for the unique client ID generation,
and addressing the issues with sharing the same public IP
due to the prevalence of NAT.
The estimated current position of a client in the virtual
queue is exposed to developers as a variable, such that
developers can customize their web interfaces (e.g., show
the estimated waiting time or error messages to clients).
The most computationally critical part of RCF is deriving
message authentication codes. To integrate with the low
overhead AES-NI implementation and be DoS-resilient, we
use Python’s ctypes library to invoke native functions and
thus achieves comparable performance with Sec˙ VI-A.
Raincheck over TCP vs. HTTP. We now discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of implementing RCF at the
TCP layer and the HTTP layer.
Implementing RCF at the TCP layer may be more robust
and efficient. It incurs less overhead as fewer layers are
passed and requests can be dropped or sent back as soon as
possible. When the bottleneck is out of application layer’s
sight (e.g., TCP flooding attack), implementation at the
5In Flask, this is implemented on top of cryptographically-signed cook-
ies.
Figure 5: Scatter plots of the initial request time vs. served time and step charts of the average waiting time.
TCP layer can also protect more resources than that at
the HTTP layer. Moreover, RCF can serve as a generic
defense mechanism that protects all upper layer protocols
and applications.
However, such a modification requires OS kernel changes
or privileged module installation on both clients and servers
which may be too intrusive and less favorable. It is also
difficult to make changes in a widely used protocol and
persuade people to update it at the same time. Furthermore,
it may not be suitable to adopt a universal setting for various
protocols and applications above TCP layer; some of them
may even be unnecessary to protect.
On the other hand, implementing RCF at the HTTP
layer is more flexible and transparent. Changes occur only
on servers and developers have the full control to decide
when to enable RCF, what resources to protect, and how to
configure the queue size, waiting time, and other parameters.
With the better knowledge of applications, RCF can be more
accurately customized to a specific situation.
RCF can also be used to protect UDP packets, and RCF
integration with UDP is relatively easier than with TCP,
since UDP is connectionless. RCF can also be applied to
protect other application requests, such as DNS queries.
Parameter Selection. We briefly describe here the rule
of thumb in selecting parameters, particularly, determining
reasonable ranges of ∆ and ∆pause within which chang-
ing these parameters does not affect much of the server’s
performance. Detailed mathematical analysis is included in
Appendix E. The value of ∆ can be determined by network
delays and memory consumption: It should be long enough
to tolerate the variance in network delay and short enough
to keep small states of accepted clients. The value of ∆pause
can be determined by bandwidth consumption and rank
feedback frequency: It should be long enough to prevent too
much overhead on frequently raincheck renewal and short
enough to update the ranking of clients promptly.
Experiment. We show the effectiveness of RCF over
HTTP on a compute-intensive web server. We deployed
the server on a m3.xlarge instance of Amazon EC2 service
in Singapore, and used another EC2 instance in Tokyo to
send requests. The configuration of the server is summarizes
below.
Server without RCF with RCF
Queue Size 16 entries
Concurrent Processing 4 clients
Computing Time per request 1.5˜2.5 seconds
∆pause N/A 1 second
∆ N/A 4 seconds
For the unprotected server, we used a FIFO queue to
buffer requests and to limit concurrent processing requests.
(Otherwise, the server will be overloaded and all the requests
will timeout.) The clients of the unprotected server retries in
1 to 5 seconds whenever the request fails until the request
is accepted, mimicking the realistic scenario.
The server receives 10 requests per second uniformly from
distinct clients for about 50 seconds. For the experimental
purpose, we assume that clients already acquired unique IDs.
Result. Figure 5 shows the result of the server with and
without RCF under the flash-crowd effect. The unprotected
server suffers from high variances in the waiting time when
the queue is full, whereas RCF server’s waiting time is
almost directly proportional to the initial request time. These
consistent results validate our simulation’s correctness and
prove RCF’s capabilities in the real world.
VII. RELATED WORK
One typical defense against service-level DDoS attacks
aims to offer a fair chance of service access to clients. To
avoid granting access to non-existing entities (e.g., via IP
address spoofing) and to limit a client’s attempt to gain
advantage over others by masquerading multiple entities,
DDoS defense mechanisms employ an interactive protocol
requesting clients to present an evidence proving the clients’
identity.
Computational puzzles [12], [15]–[18] demand clients to
show their computational effort to get a service. Despite
simple and stateless, they cause high overhead to legitimate
clients while providing only weak probabilistic waiting time
guarantee [7], which hinders their real world adoption.
CAPTCHAs [19] use a hard AI problem, which can be
easily solved by most humans but not by machines (e.g.,
bots), to test the human presence behind a service request.
CAPTCHAs have been widely adopted by many web-based
applications to test human presence, and is also used to
distinguish Flash Crowd and a DDoS attack [20]. How-
ever, advances in CAPTCHA breaking techniques [21]–
[23] weaken its effectiveness as a DDoS defense tool.
Furthermore, requirement for human interaction limits its
applications.
We follow a line of thought of latency-based proof-of-
work [24], where a server under a DoS attack prioritizes the
requests of the clients who have waited long for the service.
Crowcroft et al. proposed a mechanism to enforce passive
delay on clients, slowing down the request rate. However,
in contrast to raincheck, this mechanism needs per-client
state at a server and does not provide any service access
guarantee.
Various proposals aiming at a faster web [25]–[28] use
a cryptographic credential (which is similar to TCP SYN
cookie [29]) to reduce the number of round trips for the
connection establishment. For example, TCP Fast Open
(TFO) [25] speeds up successive TCP connections using
a TFO cookie, a server-generated Message Authentication
Code that proves the client’s ownership of a source IP.
Technically, RCF creates credentials in a similar way to
the aforementioned mechanisms. A key distinction is that
each raincheck contains a fine-grained timestamp by which
RCF performs admission control, guaranteeing a maximum
waiting time for establishing a connection.
Queuing systems are heavily researched in computer
science and operations research. Some mechanisms [30],
[31] assign queues to aggregated requests by their origin.
Among them, Lee et al. [31] proposed a mechanism that
provides differential guarantees to the aggregates based on
the observation that bot distribution is not uniform across do-
mains. Stoica et al. [32] proposed a core stateless weighted
fair queueing mechanism for fair network scheduling. Only
edge routers maintain per-flow state while core routers use
the labels inside packet headers created by edge routers
to realize fair scheduling. However, queuing systems do
not intend to offer nor can they provide precise waiting
time guarantees to clients. Alternately, Gligor [7] proposed
a scheme that provides per-client, maximum waiting time
guarantees via precisely time-scheduled service-access to-
kens. Such scheduling requires conservative workload pre-
diction for every single service and assumes all granted
tokens would be used on time—which unavoidably leads
to significant resource under-utilization.
Service replication via infrastructure outsourcing is a
common practice for DDoS mitigation. However, many
services, such as financial, government, and healthcare
services, are hard to replicated/relocatable, distributed, or
outsourced, e.g., for security and privacy reasons. Moreover,
SSL-protected contents can only be served via a man-
in-the-middle approach [33], which is highly undesirable
from a security perspective. Traffic-scrubbing clouds are
ineffective when it is difficult to differentiate malicious and
legitimate clients. RCF outperforms prior works as it can be
a simple yet practical solution to protect initial requests and
guarantees access to a public service that cannot afford a
server farm.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Recent technology advances introduce unfortunate side ef-
fects: Internet users are becoming increasingly impatient. To
increase users’ willingness to wait, the waiting time should
be kept small and with low variances, and users should be
informed with accurate waiting time estimations. To this end,
We propose RCF, a lightweight DDoS mitigation primitive
that bounds the waiting time of a legitimate client. RCF
achieves strong guarantees by leveraging the network as a
virtual queue and ordering clients based on their arrival time,
such that the resulting guarantees are close to the optimal
case where the server has infinite memory. Since RCF
focuses on bounding waiting time, it can work in conjunction
with DDoS countermeasures that differentiate bots from
legitimate clients to further strengthen the waiting time
guarantees. Without RCF, there is little hope for legitimate
clients to access the flooded server because the attacker
who sends a large number of requests has huge advantage
over legitimate clients. In contrast, with RCF, the server
effectively provides legitimate clients with access guarantees
in the presence of bot-driven DDoS attacks or flash crowds.
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APPENDIX
A. Client ID Selection
RCF assumes each client has a unique and unforgeable
ID and allows web developers to flexibly choose their
identification methods, such as login, CAPTCHA, single
sign-on, IP address, or a combination of multiple factors.
Here we discuss possible choices of client IDs.
When using IP addresses as client IDs, it is assumed that
an IP address represents the identity of a client, and RCF
provides per-IP fairness, which effectively limits the sending
rate of requests originating from each client. However, this
assumption generally does not hold in practice as NATs are
widely-deployed in the Internet, and all clients behind the
same NAT have the same public IP address. Hence, if RCF
treats each unique public IP address as one client, clients
behind NATs will not be given a fair-share of the server’s
resource.
To provide fairness in this context, we present two ap-
proaches. One possible approach is to assign a unique ID
that is independent of the IP address to each client. Such
approach allows RCF to identify the clients that are behind
the same NATs as each client would have different client ID.
However, such an approach is susceptible to Sybil attacks,
where a client creates multiple IDs to gain unfair advantage.
To mitigate the effects of Sybil attacks, the websites can
require users to create user IDs and make the process of
creating user IDs difficult to discourage from a malicious
or greedy user from creating multiple IDs. To this end,
CAPTCHA [19] or mobile SMS authentication can be used
as part of the user ID creation.
Another approach to fair resource sharing is based on dif-
ferential allocations based on prior connection history. The
server can consider a fairness model where the allocation of
server resources is proportional to the number of requests
during peacetime (e.g., when the server is not flooded) [34].
Specifically, the server splits IP addresses into blocks and
measures the number of requests served per address block
during peacetime. Such information is used during an attack
for a fair allocation of server resources based on the IP
address space. However, this requires keeping state for each
address block at the server.
B. Waiting Time Estimation
Providing users with feedback of their expected waiting
time can help increase their willingness to wait [3], [4].
While the waiting time bound T can serve as a loose estimate
of the actual waiting time, we desire a better estimate that
incorporates the current client status. We design and analyze
a rank estimation algorithm that allows the server to estimate
any client c’s rank (i.e., its position in the virtual queue)
at time t without keeping per-client state. To achieve this
goal, our rank estimation algorithm extends a probabilistic
counting algorithm [10] so that the estimate can be refined
over time by taking into account the number of clients
that did not renew their rainchecks. The server can inform
the client of the estimated rank by piggybacking it on the
raincheck.
Efficient and accurate rank estimation is challenging:
Counting the number of issued rainchecks with a smaller
timestamp value than that of client c is inefficient because it
requires maintaining one counter for each client. Moreover,
since a client can have multiple valid rainchecks at hand,
the server should prevent counting the same client twice.
Background of FM sketches. To provide efficient and
accurate estimation, our rank estimation algorithm extends
a probabilistic counting algorithm proposed by Flajolet and
Martin [10], which estimates the number of distinct items
in a set using O(logN) memory, where N is the number of
distinct items. The probabilistic counting algorithm keeps a
bit vector (referred to as an FM sketch) that is initialized to
zeros, and uses a deterministic function to map an item to
the ith bit with probability 1/2i. A bit is set to 1 if an item
is mapped to that bit. Given an FM sketch V the estimated
number of distinct items is
n˜ = 2lsb0(V )/0.77351,
where lsb0(V ) is the lowest-order 0-bit position of V (zero-
based indexing). One can reduce the estimation error by
averaging the results of multiple FM sketches with different
index functions. The FM algorithm guarantees a bounded
error such that
Pr[|n˜− n| < ǫN ] > 1− δ
with O( log(2/δ)ǫ2 ) number of sketches.
Our rank estimation algorithm. Before explaining how
our algorithm works, we first define several notations. Let
U tt−∆(x) contain all clients obtaining at least one raincheck
with a timestamp ≤ x during [t−∆, t). Let ntt−∆(x) be the
size of U tt−∆(x). Since a client in front of c at time t must
be in U tt−∆(TS(ρc)), rank(c, t) ≤ ntt−∆(TS(ρc)), where
ρc is client c’s raincheck that has the smallest timestamp
value among all valid rainchecks at time t and TS stands
for timestamp.
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Figure 6: A rank estimation sketch example.
Estimating each client’s rank separately using FM
sketches requires O(N logN) memory. In contrast, our rank
estimation algorithm is designed to answer queries such as
“How many distinct items have a value lower than x?” for
any x, while keeping only O(logN) number of items.
Specifically, the update and estimate operations in our
rank estimation algorithm work as follows:
• Update: Instead of setting a bit to one, we store the
item’s value at the mapped position if the value is lower
than the currently stored value at that position.
• Estimate: To estimate the number of items whose
value is lower than x for any x, we convert this rank
estimation sketch back to an FM sketch where a 1-bit
is set if the corresponding position has a value < x.
Figure 6 illustrates how the rank estimation sketch works
and its relationship with FM sketches.
The core idea is that the rank estimation sketch ensures
that the resulting FM sketch is the same as the one we can
get by running the FM algorithm over items with a value
lower than x. In our setting, items are rainchecks, and each
raincheck has a value which is a timestamp. Two rainchecks
are “identical” if they are from the same client. Hence, using
this rank estimation algorithm, we can estimate ntt−∆(x) for
any x given a time interval [t−∆, t).
To estimate a client’s rank at time tcur in the virtual queue,
the server maintains a rank estimation sketch and resets it
periodically every ∆ time, such that the sketch accounts for
intervals [(i− 1)∆, i∆) for all positive integers i. The rank
rank(c, tcur) can be approximated by the following:
rank(c, tcur) ≤ rank(c, i∆) ≤ ni∆(i−1)∆(TS(ρc)),
where i∆ ≤ tcur < (i+ 1)∆.
Based on the proof in Section IV-A, rank(c, i∆) −
rank(c, tcur) ≤ (tcur − i∆)Rs. Also, ni∆(i−1)∆(TS(ρc)) −
rank(c, i∆) ≤ ∆Rs. Hence, with O( log(2/δ)ǫ2 ) number of
sketches, we ensure that the estimation error is less than
ǫN + (tcur − (i− 1)∆)Rs ≤ ǫN + 2∆Rs with probability
higher than 1− δ.
C. Balancing Load Distribution
To avoid sudden increase in the bandwidth loads in the
rare case when all clients retry concurrently, it is desirable to
distribute the bandwidth loads caused by raincheck renewals.
We propose a hybrid scheme that combines RCF with a
coarse-grained scheduling for balancing load distribution.
Similar to the original RCF, this hybrid scheme requires
each client to renew its raincheck periodically. The novel
improvement is the assignment of the coarse time interval
such that all the requests from the same client always fall
in the same time interval, thereby reducing the overhead for
duplicate detection and rate limiting.
In particular, the server divides the time into non-
overlapping time intervals δi = [i · w, (i+ 1) · w) for some
constant w. A raincheck issued during δi is valid only during
δj where j ∈ [i+mmin, i+mmax) for some required cooling
period mmin and expiration period mmax = mmin +m∆.
mmin, mmax, and m∆ are positive integers. The integer
value j is derived such that
i+mmin ≤ j < i+mmax,
j mod m∆ = PRFk(cid) mod m∆,
where k is a secret key and PRF is a pseudorandom
function. These equations have a unique solution.
This construction ensures that every raincheck-carrying
request from the same client always comes back during
the same time interval. Also, requests are renewed approxi-
mately every m∆ time intervals. Therefore, the server only
needs to keep track of the accepted requests during the
current time interval, δi, for duplicate detection and rate
limiting. This hybrid scheme is easier to implement as the
server does not need to maintain a sliding window of ∆ as
in the original RCF.
The server may want to update the secret key to increase
randomness and minimize the risk of key exposure. Suppose
the server would like to completely switch to a new key k′
from the beginning of δv. To ensure a smooth transition, the
server chooses to use either the old key or the new key from
the beginning of δv−mmax on a per-request-basis according
to the following criterion: if j < v when computing j using
the old key, use the old key; otherwise use the new key.
This hybrid scheme trades flexibility for scalability. At
one extreme where the PRF perfectly distributes the clients
among m∆ intervals, the overhead (e.g., storage or band-
width consumed by raincheck renewal) is reduced by an
order of m∆. In particular, we obtain a MWT guarantee
⌈NL ⌉w when w ≥ LRs . We omit this proof since it is similar
to that in Section IV. At the other extreme where the PRF
maps every client to the same time interval, it is degenerated
to the original RCF with ∆ = mmax ·w, rendering a MWT
bound ⌈NL ⌉mmaxw. Since any practical implementation of
PRF should generate reasonably randomized outputs given
that the key is kept secret, this hybrid scheme is expected
to have much better scalability than the original RCF.
The server can adjust mmax dynamically to distribute the
load among mmax −mmin intervals such that the server is
slightly overloaded during each interval. The mmin value
should be large enough to ensure that requests can return to
the server on time.
D. Accommodating Multiple Rainchecks
There are applications where multiple rainchecks may
be needed per client. For example, if RCF is applied to
the HTTP protocol and each raincheck allows one HTTP
request, multiple rainchecks would be needed to load a
single webpage.6 Getting a raincheck for each request se-
quentially would significantly increase the waiting time of
the client. Our implementation in Section VI-B resolves this
6A a typical webpage requires multiple HTTP requests. Modern browsers
support concurrent HTTP connections. For example, Firefox allows 15
concurrent HTTP connections.
issue by enabling one RCF instance per resource-consuming
URL, which likely account for a small set of all the HTTP
requests for a webpage, such that the client can use multiple
rainchecks in parallel. Here we explore the effects of using
an extended rate limit mechanism that allows a sender to
have multiple requests in the virtual queue.
RCF can be extended to accomodate n-rainchecks per
client to support similar cases as above. When a client’s
raincheck is accepted, at most n-1 additional rainchecks can
be renewed or accepted for the same client during ∆. That
is, at any point in time, the total number of client’s requests
in the server should be less than or equal to n. RCF can also
issue rainchecks to resource-consuming requests only, which
likely account for a small set of all the HTTP requests for
a webpage.
Simulation: Effects of Supporting Multiple
Rainchecks.
The parameters that are used for the simulations in
flooding attacks (Section V-B) are used. However, instead of
submitting one request, each client submits five requests, and
the amount of time that is needed to have all five requests
accepted by the server is measured.
Client’s request sending strategy is modified to handle
multiple requests. A raincheck client sends all five requests
simultaneously unless the server allows a smaller number of
simultaneous requests. If the server allows a fewer number
of simultaneous requests, the client initially submits the
maximum number of requests that are allowed by the server,
and for each accepted request, the remaining requests are
submitted sequentially after waiting for ∆. For a puzzle
client, the client initially submits all five requests with the
lowest-level puzzles. For each returned request, the client
resubmits the request with a puzzle that is a level higher
than the previous puzzle. For an unprotected client, the
client submits all five requests simultaneously. Then for
each returned request, the client immediately resubmits the
request to the server.
Figure 7 summarizes the waiting times for the clients
to get 5 requests accepted. The leftmost figure 7 shows
the longest waiting times for the 10,000 raincheck clients
when the server allows 3 and 7 simultaneous requests.
Furthermore, a box plot showing the distribution of the
waiting times for the 10,000 clients are shown for the
case where the server allows 5 simultaneous requests per
client. The figures in the middle and the right describe the
distribution of the waiting times for the 10,000 clients for
the puzzle and normal servers, respectively.
As expected, clients of all three models need to wait
longer to get their 5 requests accepted by the servers. The
primary reason for the longer waits are due to the increase in
client’s traffic—each client submits 5 requests. Moreover in
the raincheck model, the volume of bots’ traffic increases
as well as bots take advantage of multiple simultaneous
rainchecks that the server allows.
Even in this simulation where the waiting time is mea-
sured as the time to get all 5 requests accepted, the raincheck
clients have the shortest maximum waiting time as well as
the smallest variance in the waiting times.
The maximum waiting time for a raincheck client is the
shortest when the raincheck server allows 5 simultaneous
requests. The waiting time increases when the server allows
7 simultaneous requests because it allows bots to flood the
server at the highest rate among the three cases. Although
bots’ flooding rate is the lowest, client’s waiting time in-
creases significantly when the server allows 3 simultaneous
request. This is because the client’s fourth and fifth requests
can only be submitted after two of the first three requests
are accepted; hence, the timestamps in the rainchecks for the
last two requests are correspondingly late as many requests
are already scheduled in the virtual queue.
The experiment suggests that if RCF were to be used for
HTTP servers and clients, the waiting time that clients would
experience depends on the number of simultaneous requests
that are allowed by the server. Moreover, the experiment
suggests that it is better for a server to allow a larger number
of simultaneous requests per client than a smaller number of
simultaneous requests compared to the number of requests
that are actually needed to load the web-pages as the latter
(allowing smaller number of simultaneous requests) may
significantly increase the waiting time.
E. Parameter Configurations
Bounding and determining the request processing rate.
To provide MWT guarantees, the bottleneck (e.g., the server)
is required to process at least Rs requests per second. We
discuss how to ensure a lower bound on Rs under several
application scenarios. We also discuss how to estimate
Rs when request processing time varies. While accurate
estimation of Rs (client’s waiting time) can improve user
experience, RCF’s operations and guarantees do not depend
on an accurate modeling of Rs.
When the server’s access link is the bottleneck, RCF
has to be installed in front of the access link, such
as at a firewall or a load balancer. Since the band-
width (BW) is the critical resource, raincheck can deter-
mine a lower bound of the request processing rate by
Rs ≥ min{downlink BWmax req ,
uplink BW
max resp }, where max req
and max resp are the maximum sizes of the request and
response packets, respectively. A similar approach can be
applied to the case that an intermediate network link is the
bottleneck.
The attacker can also try to exhaust the CPU resource.
Although the server has full knowledge about the type
of service it offers, the time to complete a request may
still be unpredictable beforehand. One possible solution is
to consider a raincheck to be an explicit permission for
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Figure 7: Waiting times for 10,000 clients to get 5 requests accepted under varying number of bots for the three server models. Starting from left: raincheck-server, puzzle-server,
unprotected-server. Note that scales for the Y-axis are different for the three graphs
accessing a unit of resources. Moreover, clients can wait
longer to obtain higher level rainchecks that give permissions
to access more resources. For example, one raincheck can
represent 10k CPU cycles or 10ms of the server time. To
adopt this modification, either (1) the client divides the task
into smaller chunks so that each chunk can be processed
in one unit of resources, or (2) the server terminates the
process for the accepted request if it has run out of one
unit of resources, and returns the necessary information such
that the server can resume the process later, if possible.
The server could also decline such computational-expensive
requests during DDoS attacks (which is similar to a safe
mode that only supports limited functionality). We leave it
as future work to explore such resource allocation polices
in the RCF framework.
When the request completion time is predictable, the
server can allocate resources to multiple request groups, each
of which consists of the requests with similar completion
time (e.g., based on their service types). Grouping similar
requests not only improves the accuracy of waiting time
estimation but also allows the server to apply RCF to
resource-consuming requests only.
RCF can also help address memory exhaustion at-
tacks such as TCP SYN flooding or slow HTTP attacks.
Rainchecks can work like SYN cookies, which push state
back to the client. In addition, by setting an explicit timeout
on each buffered request, the request processing time is
bounded too and thus RCF can be applied.
Configuring ∆. Let M be the size of the memory (in
terms of the number of requests) available for RCF. Recall
that Rin is the incoming request rate, Rs is the server’s
request processing rate, ∆ the expiration period, and N is
the number of clients.
According to Section III, clients wishing to stay in the
virtual queue must renew their rainchecks before they ex-
pire. Hence, the expiration period should be long enough
to accommodate every client in the worst case. That is,
Rin · ∆ ≥ N . On the other hand, the expiration period
should be short enough to avoid keeping too much state at
the server: Rs ·∆ ≤M . These two constraints can serve as
guidelines for RCF configuration.
Since the server typically has no control over N and may
be unable to immediately increase memory, we can set ∆ to
be N˜Rin , where N˜ is the estimate of the number of clients.
The server can obtain N˜ based on the recent history, and
adjust ∆ accordingly if the estimation changes. If the ∆
value does not satisfy the second constraint, the server can
either reduce the request processing rate to Rs = M∆ or
increase its memory size if possible. Note the reducing Rs
to M∆ does not affect the MWT since Rs is still higher than
L
∆ , which is required for obtaining the MWT bound in the
worst-case scenario in Section IV.
We now briefly discuss how to set the parameters for
the hybrid scheme described in Appendix C. In the hybrid
scheme, the server similarly has to satisfy Rin ·m∆ ·w ≥ N
and Rs · w ≤ M . Given the introduction of an additional
parameter, m∆, we can fulfill the second criterion first by
setting w = MRs . We then set m∆ =
N˜
Rin·w .
